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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ___________ 
 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this age discrimination case, Frederick F. Keller 
appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of his former employer, ORIX Credit Alliance, Inc.  Keller 
alleges that Credit Alliance violated the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et 
seq., by failing to promote him to the position of Chief 
Operating Officer, and then terminating his employment.  Keller 
makes three principal arguments:  first, that summary judgment 
was inappropriate because there was sufficient direct evidence of 
discrimination to create a material issue of fact as to the 
legitimacy of his discharge; second, that the district court 
required Keller to establish an impermissibly burdensome prima 
facie case under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine line of authority; 
and finally, that the indirect evidence of discrimination, 
combined with evidence of pretext in Credit Alliance's proffered 
reason for his discharge, created a material issue of fact. 
 For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment. 
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 I. 
 Credit Alliance is a commercial finance company that 
lends money to its customers for the lease or purchase of capital 
equipment.  Credit Alliance profits by borrowing money at one 
interest rate, and lending it to its customers at a higher rate. 
 As of September, 1989, Frederick Keller was an Executive Vice 
President and Director of Credit Alliance.  His primary 
responsibility was to raise the funds that Credit Alliance 
intended to lend to its customers.  Keller became responsible for 
raising capital when Credit Alliance was sold in September of 
1989 by First Interstate Bancorp to the ORIX Group.  When Credit 
Alliance was owned by First Interstate, First Interstate provided 
most of Credit Alliance's capital needs.  When ORIX acquired 
Credit Alliance, however, it established a goal for Credit 
Alliance to develop as quickly as possible its own "credit 
facilities" in order to become financially independent from ORIX. 
 In the interim, ORIX arranged to have First Interstate continue 
to provide working capital until Credit Alliance achieved 
financial independence. 
 Keller was responsible for spearheading the effort to 
acquire sufficient funding to achieve Credit Alliance's goal of 
financial independence.  Before the ORIX acquisition, Keller 
estimated that it would require $1.5 billion to achieve financial 
independence from First Interstate, and that this was an 
attainable goal.  Credit Alliance apparently adopted this figure 
and used it to critique Keller's performance based on his 
relative progress toward this figure. 
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 For reasons contested by both parties, Keller never 
reached this goal.  The most credit Keller was ever able to 
acquire for Credit Alliance was $785 million as of September, 
1991.  By September 1992, however, the credit available to Credit 
Alliance was reduced to $695 million because four of the seven 
lines of credit arranged by Keller were terminated.  Credit 
Alliance contends that the reason Keller never reached his credit 
goal was because he was unreceptive to creative fundraising 
tools, lacked the initiative to pursue financing routes around 
the country, and lacked the diplomatic skills to negotiate with 
Japanese bankers.  Keller argues that the economic recession, as 
well as many sources' unwillingness to lend to Japanese-owned 
firms because of the downturn in the Japanese economy, were the 
true reasons for his inability to reach the funding goal.  
Additionally, he points out that his job was to obtain financing 
on the most favorable terms, and that because of the recession, 
the financing provided by First Interstate was the most 
favorable. 
 In April of 1992, Daniel Ryan, Credit Alliance's Chief 
Executive Officer, met with Keller to discuss the financing 
effort.  Ryan complained that he had not observed Keller 
traveling to develop relationships with bankers, and then 
allegedly stated, "If you are getting too old for the job, maybe 
you should hire one or two young bankers."  Ryan admits saying 
"maybe you should hire one or two young bankers," but he denies 
saying "if you are getting too old for the job."  Keller 
documented the contents of this meeting in his journal, including 
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the statement Ryan admits making, but the "if you are getting too 
old" part is not recorded in the journal. 
 According to Credit Alliance, Ryan and many members of 
the Board of Directors overseeing Credit Alliance became 
increasingly concerned about the progress being made toward 
financial independence.  The parties dispute where these people 
placed the blame for the failure:  Credit Alliance contends that 
on many occasions it warned Keller that his performance was 
unacceptable; in contrast, Keller maintains that while some board 
members expressed their concern as to the progress being made, 
they ultimately accepted Keller's assessment that the state of 
the economy made it impossible for him to secure financing on 
favorable terms. 
 In May of 1992, Ryan promoted Philip Cooper, age 43, to 
the position of Chief Operating Officer.  In the 18 months before 
his promotion, Cooper had taken responsibility for a transaction 
resulting in a four million dollar loss to Credit Alliance, and 
his region had higher "past due" statistics than comparable 
regions.  Despite the fact that Keller had expressed an interest 
in the position, Ryan did not consider Keller for Chief Operating 
Officer.  According to Ryan, he was looking for someone with 
"line experience," and Keller was simply not qualified for the 
position. 
 In September of 1992, Ryan decided to terminate Keller. 
 Ryan hired an executive search firm to find candidates for 
Keller's position.  Among the criteria listed by the defendant in 
a potential candidate were "experience in implementing asset-
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backed securitization programs and other creative forms of fund 
raising, strong skills in working with rating agencies and 
bankers, particularly Japanese bankers, and be result-driven."  
In April of 1993, Ryan officially terminated Keller.  He offered 
Keller's failure to raise adequate financing and the resulting 
displeasure of the Board of Directors and other ORIX officers as 
the reason for Keller's termination. 
 At or shortly after the termination meeting, Keller, 
while negotiating the amount of his severance pay, asked Ryan if 
the reason for his dismissal was his age, and reminded Ryan of 
the alleged age comment.  Ryan then replied that Keller should 
"do what he had to," because he had checked with their lawyer and 
been assured that they would have no problem with an age 
discrimination claim, but that he (the lawyer) could be wrong 
because he was just a lawyer. 
 Ryan hired Joseph McDevitt, age 46, to replace Keller. 
 Within a year, McDevitt exceeded the $1.5 billion goal.  The 
parties' briefs do not disclose whether or not the terms of the 
financing obtained by McDevitt were significantly more favorable 
than from First Interstate. 
 Keller subsequently brought suit against ORIX in 
federal district court alleging age discrimination under the ADEA 
and the NJLAD, for failing to promote him to the position of 
Chief Operating Officer a year prior to his dismissal, and for 
terminating him in 1993.  In ruling on Credit Alliance's motion 
for summary judgment, the district court found that Keller had 
not established a prima facie case.  According to the district 
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court, the age difference between Keller and his replacement was 
not sufficient to establish that he was replaced by someone 
significantly younger, and because the undisputed evidence 
demonstrates that Keller did not reach the financing goal, he was 
not qualified for the position.  Keller v. Orix, No. 93-3466, 
slip op. at 8-9 (D.N.J. April 6, 1995).  In the alternative, the 
court concluded that even if Keller had established a prima facie 
case, he did not establish that the legitimate business reason 
proffered by Credit Alliance was a mere pretext for 
discrimination.  The court stated that: 
Keller's failure to make adequate progress towards the 
$1.5 billion independent financing goal is a 
legitimate business reason for his 
termination.  * * *  Keller's claim that it 
was impossible to raise sufficient funds is 
not persuasive in his attempt to prove that 
Credit Alliance's proffered reason for 
termination was merely pretext for 
discrimination. 
Id. at 10.  The district court, therefore, granted Credit 
Alliance's motion for summary judgment as to Keller's federal 
claims, and dismissed the pendant state law claim.  This appeal 
followed. 
 II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 29 
U.S.C. § 626(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have jurisdiction over 
the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a 
district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary, and we are 
required to apply the same test the district court should have 
utilized initially.  Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 
893, 896 (3d Cir. 1987) (in banc).  In a discrimination case, we 
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must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to create a 
genuine issue as to whether the employer intentionally 
discriminated.  Weldon v. Kraft, 896 F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir. 
1990).  For a defendant-employer to succeed, it must show that 
"the plaintiff will be unable to introduce either direct evidence 
of a purpose to discriminate or indirect evidence by showing that 
the proffered reason is subject to factual dispute."  Id. 
(quoting Hankins v. Temple University, 829 F.2d 437, 440 (3d Cir. 
1987)).  We, of course, must examine the record in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all 
reasonable inferences in his or her favor.  Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 n.2 (1986) ("[a]ny 
doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial should be 
resolved against the moving party."); 10A Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2727 at 124-24 ("Because the 
burden is on the movant, the evidence presented to the court 
always is construed in favor of the party opposing the motion and 
he is given the benefit of all favorable inferences that can be 
drawn from it.").  "This standard is applied with added rigor in 
employment discrimination cases, where intent and credibility are 
crucial issues."  Robinson v. PPG Indus. Inc., 23 F.3d 1159, 1162 
(7th Cir. 1994). 
 III. 
 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act makes it 
unlawful to "discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
  
 
 9 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's age."  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).  Like other employment 
discrimination claims, claims under the ADEA can be established 
either by the presentation of direct evidence of discrimination 
under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), or from 
evidence which creates an inference of discrimination under the 
framework of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine.  Keller argues that there 
is sufficient evidence in this case to withstand a motion for 
summary judgment under either approach.1 
 A. Mixed Motive under Price Waterhouse. 
 When an employee shows "by direct evidence that an 
illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the 
[employment] decision," Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 276 (1989) (O'Connor, J. concurring), the burden of 
persuasion shifts to the employer to show that even if 
discrimination was a motivating factor in the discharge, it would 
have made the same decision absent the discriminatory animus.  
Id. at 244-46; Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 778 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurring opinion 
in Price Waterhouse: 
Stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative 
of sexual harassment, cannot justify 
requiring the employer to prove that its 
hiring or promotional decisions were based on 
                     
1.   For the purposes of summary judgment, whether Price 
Waterhouse or McDonnell Douglas-Burdine governs is not directly 
relevant.  In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court 
must simply determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 
create a material issue of fact as to whether the employer relied 
upon an illegitimate criterion in making its employment decision. 
 For the sake of clarity, however, we will address the evidence 
in this case under both analytical frameworks. 
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legitimate criteria.  Nor can statements by 
nondecisionmakers, or statements by 
decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional 
process itself, suffice to satisfy the 
plaintiff's burden in this regard . . . .  
What is required is . . . direct evidence 
that decisionmakers placed substantial 
negative reliance on an illegitimate 
criterion in reaching their decision. 
Id. at 277 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (citation omitted).  The 
Civil Rights Act of 1992 modified Price Waterhouse, making it 
unlawful for an illegitimate criterion to be a motivating factor 
for any employment practice, even though other factors may also 
have motivated the practice.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).  
Accordingly, when an employee presents evidence that a 
decisionmaker relied upon an illegitimate criterion, summary 
judgment for the employer is rarely, if ever, appropriate.  
Weldon, 767 F.2d at 797; Hankins, 829 F.2d at 440. 
A plaintiff who makes such a case in resisting the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment does 
not need the help of McDonnell Douglas to 
resist the motion.  He walks as it were 
without crutches.  For he has presented 
enough evidence to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment under the general test for 
the grant of such a motion . . . 
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 1990).  As we 
have recognized, "[w]hen direct evidence is available, problems 
of proof are no different than in other civil cases."  
Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 896.  The issue becomes whether or not 
the employer did in fact rely upon the illegitimate criterion, 
which "is precisely the sort of question which must be left to 
the jury."  Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 
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1990).  As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
observed, 
When confronted with an action where there are two 
alleged motives for the dismissal, one 
legitimate and the other illegitimate, and 
there exists more than a modicum of evidence 
in support of the illegitimate motive, we 
conclude that the law is generally better 
served by having such cases examined in the 
crucible of a contested hearing.  A trial 
becomes appropriate to evaluate whether the 
employer is attempting to avoid liability 
based on an illegitimate motive by simply 
supplying a legitimate one at the summary 
judgment phase. 
Visser v. Packer Engineering Associates, Inc., 909 F.2d 959, 961 
(7th Cir. 1990). 
 Typically, what is commonly understood as direct 
evidence is not available because the decisionmaker "is unlikely 
to admit that he fired an employee because of age or sex."  Hook 
v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 1994).  "Employers 
are rarely so cooperative as to include a notation in the 
personnel file, `fired due to age,' or to inform a dismissed 
employee candidly that he is too old for the job."  Thornbrough 
v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 Consequently, "circumstantial evidence `tied directly to the 
alleged discriminatory animus' is sufficient to constitute direct 
evidence justifying a burden-shifting instruction."  Id. (quoting 
Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Companies, 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d 
Cir. 1992)). 
If, however, the plaintiff's nonstatistical evidence is 
directly tied to the forbidden animus, for 
example policy documents or statements of 
persons involved in the decisionmaking 
process that reflect a discriminatory or 
retaliatory animus of the type complained of 
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in the suit, that plaintiff is entitled to a 
burden shifting instruction. 
Id. (quoting Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 182) (emphasis added).  The 
term "direct evidence," therefore, is an unfortunate misnomer.  
Id.  In other words, to come within the Price Waterhouse 
framework, the evidence presented by the plaintiff need only 
reflect a discriminatory animus on the part of a person involved 
in the decisionmaking process.  Id.; Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 778. 
 Keller provided evidence that reflects a discriminatory 
animus on the part of a person involved in the decisionmaking 
process.  Keller testified that during the first meeting in which 
he was ever criticized about his job performance, Ryan 
specifically stated that "[i]f you are getting to old for the 
job, maybe you should hire one or two young bankers."2 
 Ryan's statement that Keller may be getting too old to 
do his job is sufficient evidence of discriminatory animus under 
Price Waterhouse.3  First, as CEO of the company, Ryan is clearly 
                     
2.   Credit Alliance argues that because the "too old" comment 
does not appear in Keller's contemporaneous notes, it should be 
disregarded.  While this is certainly a powerful argument for a 
jury, Credit Alliance's argument goes to the weight of the 
evidence, and is a question for the finder of fact.  Shager, 913 
F.2d at 402 ("[T]he task of disambiguating ambiguous utterances 
is for trial, not for summary judgment.  On a motion for summary 
judgment the ambiguities in a witness's testimony must be 
resolved against the moving party."). 
3.   The district court did not address Keller's claim that this 
comment is sufficient as direct evidence of discrimination or 
that it supports an inference of discrimination.  Instead, the 
court does not appear to have focused upon the inferences and 
presumption that the nonmoving party is entitled to, and simply 
accepted Credit Alliance's interpretation of the statement as 
authorizing Keller to hire additional staff.  See Keller, slip 
op. at 4. 
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a decisionmaker, and in this case has admitted that he was the 
principal decisionmaker in firing Keller.  Second, it seems 
rather obvious that Ryan's suggestion that Keller may be getting 
too old to properly perform his job and that he hire younger 
bankers could reflect discriminatory animus toward Keller's age. 
 Such a comment, if true, is by no means shrouded in ambiguity, 
and there is no evidence to suggest that it was stated 
facetiously.  In addition, the comment was made during a 
conversation about Keller's performance.  According to Keller, 
the comment was made at the meeting in which he was first 
informed that his performance was considered unsatisfactory.  We 
can only conclude, therefore, that it was related to the 
decisionmaking process itself.  Ryan himself admits (in fact 
argues) that he was critical of Keller's performance at the time 
this alleged comment was made.  Finally, Ryan decided to fire 
Keller only a few months later.  The age related comment, 
therefore, is probative of the factors considered in Ryan's 
decision to terminate Keller.  See Robinson, 23 F.3d at 1165 
(holding that comments about the company not keeping employees on 
until they reached sixty-five could not be considered stray 
remarks for the purposes of summary judgment); Shager, 913 F.2d 
at 402 (holding that comments including "These older people don't 
much like or much care for us baby boomers, but there isn't much 
they can do about it," constituted direct evidence at the summary 
judgment phase). 
 Credit Alliance argues that this statement is simply a 
stray remark, and is therefore not direct evidence of 
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discrimination.  The thrust of its argument is that this was the 
only age related remark Keller could recall.  A single comment, 
however, is not necessarily a stray remark merely because it was 
only uttered on one occasion.  If the single comment is made by a 
decisionmaker and reflects a discriminatory animus toward the 
plaintiff in the decisionmaking process, it might well constitute 
direct evidence of discrimination.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 
241 ("The critical inquiry . . . is whether [the illegitimate 
criterion] was a factor in the employment decision . . .").  
Unlike hostile environment claims, Price Waterhouse considers 
only the nature and probative value of the alleged discriminatory 
comment, and not the frequency with which it was stated, because 
an employer's "[r]eliance on [illegal] factors is exactly what 
the threat of Title VII liability was meant to deter."  Id. at 
265 (O'Connor, J., concurring).  As discussed above, the alleged 
age-related remark in this case was made by the principal 
decisionmaker during his critique of Keller's work performance, 
and could be interpreted as reflecting a negative attitude toward 
his age.  Robinson, 23 F.3d at 1165 (holding that potentially age 
related comments made by the supervisor who decided to terminate 
the plaintiff were sufficient direct evidence of discrimination 
to survive summary judgment). 
 As we have stated, since "discriminatory comments by an 
executive connected with the decisionmaking process will often be 
the plaintiff's strongest circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination, they are highly relevant . . ."  Abrams v. 
Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1995).  Because 
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Keller presented circumstantial evidence which could allow a jury 
to conclude that Ryan relied on an illegitimate criterion in 
making his employment decision, summary judgment was 
inappropriate.  Given this evidence, Credit Alliance's proffered 
legitimate reason for discharging Keller simply creates a 
material issue of fact, rather than demonstrating the absence of 
one. 
 B. Pretext under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. 
 While Price Waterhouse involves evidence which directly 
reflects discriminatory animus, cases under McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine involve circumstances which, if left unexplained or 
without a credible explanation, allow a jury to infer 
discriminatory animus.  As the Supreme Court has noted, 
we are willing to presume this largely because we know 
from our experience that more often than not 
people do not act in a totally arbitrary 
manner, without any underlying reasons, 
especially in a business setting.  Thus, when 
all legitimate reasons for rejecting an 
applicant have been eliminated as possible 
reasons for the employer's actions, it is 
more likely than not the employer, who we 
generally assume acts only with some reason, 
based his decision on an impermissible 
consideration such as race. 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) 
(emphasis in original); Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 897.  The Supreme 
Court, therefore, established the now familiar shifting burdens 
of production. 
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the 
preponderance of the evidence a prima facie 
case of discrimination.  Second, if the 
plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie 
case, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employee's rejection.  Third, 
  
 
 16 
should the defendant carry this burden, the 
plaintiff must then have an opportunity to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the legitimate reasons offered by the 
defendant were not its true reasons, but were 
a pretext for discrimination. 
Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-53 
(1981) (citations omitted).  These shifting burdens "are designed 
to assure that the `plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the 
unavailability of direct evidence.'"  Trans World Airlines, Inc. 
v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (quoting Loeb v. Textron, 
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)).  In this case, the 
district court concluded that Keller failed to establish a prima 
facie case, and in the alternative that he failed to present any 
evidence that Credit Alliance's proffered reason was pretextual. 
 We disagree. 
 1. The Prima Facie Case under the ADEA. 
 To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination 
under the ADEA, Keller must show:  (1) that he belongs to the 
protected class; (2) that he was qualified for the position; 
(3) that he suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) that 
he was replaced by someone sufficiently younger to permit an 
inference of age discrimination or his employer continued to seek 
applicants from among those having his qualifications.  Sempier 
v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 728 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 897.  See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin 
Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).  According to the 
district court, Keller failed to demonstrate that he had been 
replaced by someone sufficiently younger or that he was qualified 
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for the position.  But as we have noted, "the prima facie case 
under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine pretext framework is not 
intended to be onerous."  Id. at 728.  And as the Supreme Court 
has noted, all that is required is "evidence adequate to create 
an inference that an employment decision was based on a[n] 
[illegal] discriminatory criterion . . . ."  Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).  For the following reasons, we 
conclude that the district court required Keller to establish an 
impermissibly demanding prima facie case. 
 A)Keller's Qualifications. 
 At the prima facie stage of the litigation, a plaintiff 
"only needs to demonstrate that [he] `possesses the basic skills 
necessary for the performance of [the] job.'"  Owens v. New York 
City Housing Auth., 934 F.2d 405, 409 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations 
omitted).  As we have stated, a plaintiff's qualifications for 
purposes of proving a prima facie case is determined by an 
objective standard.  Sempier, 45 F.3d at 729; Weldon v. Kraft, 
Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir. 1990); Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 
F.2d 701, 707 (3d Cir. 1989).  Accordingly, the proper inquiry is 
whether Keller had the "objective experience and educational 
background necessary to qualify as a viable candidate for the 
position[] he held."  Sempier, 45 F.3d at 729.  Any subjective 
analysis of the employee's job performance is properly examined 
at the pretext stage of the litigation.  Id.; Weldon, 896 F.2d at 
798.  Even arguably quantifiable measures such as "productivity" 
and "output" can constitute a "subjective determination by [the 
defendant] of the performance level [plaintiff] had to achieve." 
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 Weldon, 896 F.2d at 799.  We rely upon objective factors alone 
because subjective evaluations "are more susceptible of abuse and 
more likely to mask pretext."  Id. at 798 (citing Fowle v. C & C 
Cola, 868 F.2d 59, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Denying a plaintiff 
"the opportunity to move beyond the initial stage of establishing 
a prima facie case because he has failed to introduce evidence 
showing he possesses certain subjective qualities would 
improperly prevent the court from examining the criteria to 
determine whether their use was mere pretext."  Id. 
 When viewed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, Keller clearly established that he was 
objectively qualified for his position.  First, Keller's 
qualifications were easily established by the mere fact that he 
had held an executive position with Credit Alliance for over 
sixteen years.  Sempier, 45 F.3d at 729 ("Sempier had the 
objective experience and education necessary to qualify as a 
viable candidate for the positions he held.  He had held 
executive positions at J & H for over twenty years.").  In 
addition, Keller had served on the board of directors for over 
six years, and had been considered for the position of President 
of the company.  While it is, of course, possible for a company 
to employ an unqualified individual and promote him or her to the 
highest levels of management, it would be imprudent for us to 
presume such an unlikely scenario at the summary judgment phase. 
 We reached the same conclusion with similar facts in Sempier.  
In that case, we noted that: 
the record of [the plaintiff's] twenty years employment 
as an executive, his record as Comptroller 
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and then Treasurer of J & H, his election to 
the Board on two occasions, and his 
appointment as Chief Financial Officer and 
then as Chief Administrative Officer leads to 
the almost inevitable inference that he was 
qualified for the position from which he was 
discharged. 
Id. at 729.  In this case, Keller's objective qualifications lead 
inevitably to the conclusion that he was qualified for the 
position from which he was discharged. 
 The district court found that Keller was not qualified 
for his job because he had failed to make adequate progress 
toward his stated goal of raising $1.5 billion.  But while the 
amount of funds Keller actually raised is obviously measured by 
an objective standard, the question whether Keller made adequate 
progress toward his goal is an inherently subjective 
determination.  In other words, whether Keller's progress can be 
considered adequate depends not only upon his results and the 
context in which those results were achieved, but whether Credit 
Alliance was satisfied with those results.  A subjective analysis 
of Keller's performance and the reasons for his failure is 
misplaced at the prima facie stage.  Weldon, 896 F.2d at 798-99 
("[W]hile objective qualifications should be considered in 
evaluating the plaintiff's prima facie case, the question of 
whether an employee possesses a subjective quality . . . is 
better left to the later stage of the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis."); Fowler, 868 F.2d at 64-65. 
 A plaintiff need only demonstrate that he or she 
possessed the objective experience and education necessary to 
perform the job in question.  Keller's education, promotions, and 
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more than sixteen years of service as an executive for Credit 
Alliance are sufficient to demonstrate that he was qualified for 
his position for purposes of establishing a prima facie case 
under the ADEA.  The question whether Keller's performance in 
reaching Credit Alliance's funding goal was adequate is a 
subjective determination best left to the pretext stage under 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine.4 
 B)Replaced by Someone Sufficiently Younger. 
 In order to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff 
must also demonstrate that he or she was replaced by someone 
sufficiently younger to permit an inference of age 
discrimination.  Sempier, 45 F.3d at 728.  The district court 
found that Keller did not meet this requirement because he was 
replaced by someone only five years younger.  Keller, slip op. at 
8.5  We disagree. 
                     
4.   The cases relied upon by Credit Alliance for the 
proposition that employees must demonstrate that they were 
performing their jobs adequately as an element of the prima facie 
case are readily distinguishable.  In every case, the plaintiff 
conceded that his or her performance was deficient and offered no 
explanation for the poor performance.  See Perry v. Prudential 
Bache Securities, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 843, 848 n.1 (D.N.J. 1989), 
aff'd without opinion, 904 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1990); Spangle v. 
Valley Forge Sewer Auth., 839 F.2d 171, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1988); 
Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1986).  
Credit Alliance's argument that Keller admitted that he was not 
qualified for the job is similarly misplaced.  Although Keller 
admits that he did not reach the financing goal, he never 
admitted that he was unqualified, or that he was responsible for 
the failure to reach the target.  Appellee's Br. at 26. 
5.   Both the district court and Credit Alliance state the age 
difference between Keller and his replacement as four years.  The 
evidence, however, clearly demonstrates that at the time Keller 
was fired, he was 51 and his replacement, Joseph McDevitt was 46. 
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 Although the district court did not have the benefit of 
guidance from the Supreme Court on this particular issue at the 
time it rendered its decision, the Court has since held that 
there is no particular age difference which must be shown to make 
out a prima facie case.  O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310 (holding 
that a plaintiff need not be replaced by someone outside the 
protected class to establish a prima facie case); Sempier, 45 
F.3d at 729.  In other words, "[t]here is no magical formula to 
measure a particular age gap and determine if it is sufficiently 
wide to give rise to an inference of discrimination."  Barber v. 
CSX Distribution Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 699 (3d Cir. 1995).  As we 
have noted: 
[d]ifferent courts have held, for instance, that a five 
year difference can be sufficient, Douglas v. 
Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 1981), 
but that a one year difference cannot.  [Gray 
v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1087 
(3d Cir. 1992)]. 
Sempier, 45 F.3d at 729.  See also Corbin v. Southland Int'l 
Trucks, 25 F.3d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding evidence of 
pretext when a 53 year-old was treated more favorably than a 
58 year-old employee).  In order to establish a prima facie case, 
the evidence need only create an inference of discrimination if 
the employer's actions are left unexplained.  O'Connor, 116 S. 
Ct. at 1310.  Accordingly, the "replacement by even an older 
employee will not necessarily foreclose prima facie proof if 
other direct or circumstantial evidence supports an inference of 
discrimination."  Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d at 533.  As the 
Supreme Court has emphasized, "[t]he fact that one person in the 
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protected class has lost out to another person in the protected 
class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of 
his age."  O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310. 
 In Sempier, for example, we found that the plaintiff 
had established a prima facie case despite being replaced by 
someone only four years younger.  45 F.3d at 729-730.  Without 
deciding whether four years alone was enough, we concluded that 
the four year difference, combined with the fact that the 
plaintiff's functions were also temporarily transferred to 
someone well over ten years younger, were sufficient to establish 
a prima facie case.  Id. 
 We conclude that if left unexplained, the five year age 
difference between Keller and his replacement, when combined with 
the other elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case 
standard, is sufficient to establish an inference that Keller's 
age was a motivating factor in Credit Alliance's decisions.  
Accord Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 1981).  
Given Keller's experience, and the fact that the age difference 
spans a difference in chronological decades, so to speak (Keller 
was in his "fifties" while his replacement was in his "forties"), 
this age difference is sufficient to support such an inference.  
See also Pace v. Southern Ry. System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1387 (11th 
Cir. 1983) ("Seldom will a sixty year-old be replaced by a person 
in the twenties.  Rather the sixty-year-old will be replaced by a 
fifty-five year-old, who, in turn, is succeeded by someone in the 
forties, who also will be replaced by a younger person."). 
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 Finally, as we discussed above in the context of Price 
Waterhouse and will address below in the context of McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine, the record contains evidence beyond the prima 
facie case that creates an inference of discrimination.  Ryan's 
alleged age-related comments support an inference that Credit 
Alliance's employment decisions with respect to Keller were based 
upon his age.  This renders the age of Keller's replacement less 
relevant for purposes of establishing a prima facie case.  
O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310 ("[T]he proper solution to the 
problem lies not in making an utterly irrelevant factor an 
element of the prima facie case, but rather in recognizing that 
the prima facie case requires `evidence adequate to create an 
inference that an employment decision was based on a[n] [illegal] 
discriminatory criterion . . . .'") (citation omitted). 
 In sum, because Keller has sufficiently demonstrated 
that he was qualified for the position from which he was 
discharged, that he was replaced by someone sufficiently younger, 
and there is additional evidence beyond the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine prima facie case standard from which a jury could 
conclude that Credit Alliance's employment decisions were 
motivated by Keller's age, the district court erred when it 
concluded that Keller failed to establish a prima facie case. 
 2.Evidence Supporting An Inference of Discrimination. 
 The district court did not address Keller's claim that 
Ryan's comment was direct evidence of discrimination, apparently 
because it concluded that Keller had failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate pretext under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. 
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 But even if we were to assume that Keller's evidence is 
insufficient under the Price Waterhouse standard, it is more than 
sufficient to withstand summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine standard.  First, because Keller offered evidence beyond 
the prima facie case from which an inference of discrimination 
could be drawn, Credit Alliance's proffered legitimate reason 
merely creates a material issue of fact as to whether the 
decision to terminate Keller was motivated by discriminatory 
animus.  Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 495, 502-03 (3d 
Cir. 1995); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 Second, Keller has offered sufficient evidence that could 
support a finding that the proffered reason is pretext, which 
creates a material issue of fact as to the credibility of Credit 
Alliance's proffered reason. 
 A)Evidence of Discrimination. 
 We have consistently held that a plaintiff who has made 
out a prima facie case can defeat a motion for summary judgment 
by "adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, that 
discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or 
determinative cause of the adverse employment action."  Fuentes, 
32 F.3d at 764.  We have also consistently held that since 
"discriminatory comments by an executive connected with the 
decisionmaking process will often be the plaintiff's strongest 
circumstantial evidence of discrimination, they are highly 
relevant. . . ."  Abrams, 50 F.3d at 1215.  Evidence of age-
biased comments made by a supervisor, therefore, could support an 
inference that the termination decision was made because of the 
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plaintiff's age.  Id. at 1214; Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 
834 (3d Cir. 1994); Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 783. 
Indeed, we have held that discriminatory comments by 
nondecisionmakers, or statements temporally 
remote from the decision at issue, may 
properly be used to build a circumstantial 
case of discrimination.  See Lockhart v. 
Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 54 
(3d Cir. 1989) (finding age-biased comment 
relevant even when made subsequent to 
plaintiff's termination); Roebuck v, Drexel 
University, 852 F.2d 715, 733 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(upholding admissibility of discriminatory 
comment by decisionmaker made five years 
before denial of tenure). 
Abrams, 50 F.3d at 1214.  When combined with Keller's prima facie 
case, Ryan's suggestion that perhaps Keller was getting "too old" 
for the job, and that maybe he should hire some "young bankers" 
could clearly support an inference of discrimination. 
 This conclusion is supported by our prior decisions.  
In Roebuck, we concluded that the comment that "in terms of 
comparable white faculty members . . . blacks would cost Drexel 
more money to hire those black faculty members," could give rise 
to an inference of discrimination even when made five years 
before the decision in question.  852 F.3d at 733.  In Lockhart, 
we found that a reasonable jury could also consider the statement 
"Westinghouse Credit was a seniority driven company with old 
management and that's going to change, `I'm going to change 
that,'" as evidence of age-bias.  879 F.2d at 54.  Similarly, in 
Waldron we found that when combined with the plaintiff's prima 
facie case, a comment that he should lose some weight because it 
would make him healthier and look younger, made five months 
before the termination, could support the conclusion that age was 
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more likely than not a determinative factor.  56 F.3d at 502.  
Likewise, an inference of discrimination was evident in Abrams, 
given comments like "things would hum around here when we got rid 
of the old fogies," and that two older employees were referred to 
as "a dinosaur" and "the old men."  50 F.3d at 1214.  Finally, in 
Torre, we found that the statement "did you forget or are you 
getting too old, you senile bastard?" could reasonably lead to an 
inference of age based discrimination.  42 F.3d at 834.  See also 
Robinson, 23 F.3d at 1165; Shager, 913 F.2d at 402-03. 
 Because Keller produced evidence that could support the 
conclusion that age was more likely than not a motivating factor 
in Ryan's decision to terminate him, Credit Alliance's proffered 
reason merely creates a material issue of fact for a jury to 
resolve.  The district court's grant of summary judgment to 
Credit Alliance, therefore, was inappropriate.  Credit Alliance 
failed to satisfy its burden of proving the absence of genuine 
issues of material fact. 
 B)Evidence That the Employer's Proffered Reason Is Not 
Worthy Of Credence. 
 A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case may 
also defeat a motion for summary judgment by presenting evidence 
from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the 
defendant's proffered justifications are not worthy of credence. 
 Torre, 42 F.3d at 832; Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (legal principle 
reaffirmed in Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., slip. op. 
at 12-13 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc)).  Credit Alliance's proffered 
reason for terminating Keller was his failure to make adequate 
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progress toward achieving their financing goal.  Credit Alliance 
argues, and the district court concluded, that Keller's evidence 
is aimed at simply demonstrating that this decision was wrong 
because, according to Keller, it was impossible to reach the 
goal.  Keller, slip op. at 10.  This misinterprets both Keller's 
evidence and argument. 
 Keller is not arguing that the proffered reason is 
pretextual because it is wrong.  He is arguing that Credit 
Alliance was aware of the outside factors which hindered his 
ability to obtain funding, and that they did not fault him for 
the results of his efforts. 
 While pretext is not demonstrated by showing that the 
employer was mistaken, Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-
Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992), it can be established by 
"evidence of inconsistencies or anomalies that could support an 
inference that the employer did not act for its stated reason."  
Sempier, 45 F.3d at 731 (citing Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth 
Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1993)) (emphasis added).  The 
thrust of Keller's argument and evidence is that Credit Alliance 
was not dissatisfied with his performance, because it knew that 
efforts to obtain outside fundraising were impeded by various 
market forces. 
 To support his claim that his performance did not play 
a role in Ryan's decision to fire him, Keller presented evidence 
that Credit Alliance's difficulty in obtaining greater financing 
was due to factors substantially beyond his control, and more 
importantly, that Credit Alliance recognized this fact.  Keller 
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argues that one of the reasons that Credit Alliance had 
difficulty obtaining new funding was that it had a poor credit 
rating which was influenced by its performance and the downturn 
of the Japanese economy.  (Credit Alliance's parent company, 
ORIX, is a Japanese owned company.)  To support his argument 
Keller submitted documents from several ratings agencies.  Keller 
also submitted evidence which focused upon the banks' reluctance 
to do business with Credit Alliance because of its poor credit 
rating, the trouble with the Japanese economy, and Credit 
Alliance's level of delinquent accounts.  In fact, several 
sources which decided to discontinue funding Credit Alliance 
justified their decision with these various reasons. 
 Keller also submitted affidavits and depositions to 
support his claim that he had informed the board of these 
difficulties and that the board accepted his explanation.  In 
particular, one member of the board of directors specifically 
corroborates Keller's claim through December of 1991.  According 
to the former director: 
At the board of directors meetings, Keller described 
the obstacles in securing credit facilities 
including Credit Alliance's past due accounts 
and the company's status as a subsidiary of a 
Japanese corporation.  No one challenged or 
disagreed with Keller's presentations at 
those meetings or suggested in any way that 
the difficulties he was encountering were in 
any way due to his performance rather than 
factors beyond his control. 
A1126 (Affidavit of Neil Umhafer).  In addition, Keller points to 
file memos that he sent to Ryan which detailed the bankers' 
statements that they would not lend to Credit Alliance because of 
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its Japanese parent company, the nature of Credit Alliance's 
business, or because of the conservative approach toward lending 
adopted by many in the credit market at the time. 
 Keller, therefore, relied upon evidence that could 
establish:  (1) that Credit Alliance's disappointing progress was 
due to forces beyond his control; (2) that Credit Alliance 
recognized that fact; and (3) that it knew that its poor showing 
was not attributable to him.  Seen in the light most favorable to 
Keller, a reasonable jury could consider Credit Alliance's 
explanation that Keller was fired for "poor performance" 
pretextual.  Sorba v. Pennsylvania Drilling Co., 821 F.2d 200, 
205 (3d Cir. 1987) (reversing summary judgment when the plaintiff 
proffered evidence "that his supervisors realized that the poor 
results were not his fault. . . .  [T]he testimony of the 
movant's witnesses was inconsistent regarding whether they 
believed [plaintiff]'s performance caused the unsatisfactory job 
results.").  See also Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989 
(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding of discrimination when the 
plaintiff demonstrated that the employer's proffered explanation, 
poor performance, was pretextual because his poor results were 
due to the company's prices and a poor customer base); Johnson v. 
Group Health Plan, 994 F.2d 543, 546 (8th Cir. 1993) (report 
stating that morale problems caused by other factors created 
factual issue regarding plaintiff's performance); Mastrangelo v. 
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 722 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(sufficient evidence that defendant's criticism of plaintiff's 
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performance was pretextual where problems of his department were 
attributable, at least in part, to matters beyond his control). 
 In further support of his claim, Keller points to the 
absence of any official criticism of his performance.  In 
Sempier, we concluded that a genuine issue existed as to pretext 
because of the plaintiff's own testimony of satisfactory 
performance combined with evidence that he was not criticized 
while still employed.  45 F.3d at 721-32.  The only evidence 
offered by Credit Alliance is the post-hoc deposition testimony 
of some of the members of the board of directors who ratified the 
decision to fire Keller.  With the exception of Ryan's testimony 
and a purported comment made after Ryan decided to fire Keller, 
much of the evidence is ambiguous as to whether the statement 
represented criticism.  For the most part, Credit Alliance asks 
us to infer that questions about the progress of the fundraising 
were criticisms of Keller's performance.  For example, Credit 
Alliance points to the fact that one of its outside directors 
suggested that Keller be relieved of his duties as Chief Credit 
Officer so he could concentrate on raising funds, and asks that 
we consider this as "criticism" of Keller's performance.  But 
that would require us to draw an unwarranted inference at the 
summary judgment phase, particularly in view of the fact that 
Keller offered evidence that when questioned about the progress, 
the board accepted his explanation that difficulties in the U.S. 
and Japanese economies made it difficult to secure funding on 
terms more favorable than the terms provided by their current 
source. 
  
 
 31 
 Finally, Keller argues that the district court 
improperly relied upon events that occurred after he was 
terminated (i.e., the success of his younger replacement), and 
also failed to acknowledge the role he played in those subsequent 
events.  As an initial matter, we agree with Keller that the 
district court improperly relied upon his successor's 
performance.  The fact that his successor reached Credit 
Alliance's goal has no bearing on whether the decision to fire 
Keller was motivated by discriminatory animus.  "The employer 
could not have been motivated by knowledge it did not have, and 
it cannot claim that the employee was fired for the 
nondiscriminatory reason."  McKennon v. Nashville Banner 
Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 (1995). 
 We also agree that Keller's performance subsequent to 
Ryan's decision to terminate him is relevant for establishing 
pretext.  Ryan testified that if Keller had come up with a plan 
and demonstrated some success in achieving it, he (Ryan) might 
have changed his mind.  Keller provided evidence to demonstrate 
that he had done the preliminary work on some, if not all, of the 
means of financing that later proved to be successful.  In 
particular, Keller points to evidence that he formulated a plan 
to achieve Credit Alliance's financing goal.  In deposition 
testimony, Ryan admitted that the steps outlined in the plan 
provided by Keller were the ones followed by Credit Alliance in 
successfully raising funds in 1993 and 1994.  For example, Keller 
briefed Ryan about the possibility of asset-backed securitization 
as a method of raising funds, and it was only months after Ryan 
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decided to fire Keller that Ryan decided to pursue this method.  
Keller also successfully secured a $100 million private placement 
which was the first step in improving Credit Alliance's credit 
rating.  Despite Keller's plan and demonstration of success, 
however, Ryan terminated him.  A jury could conclude that Keller 
played a significant role in Credit Alliance's subsequent ability 
to reach its funding goal, and that Credit Alliance's claim of 
poor performance, therefore, was pretextual. 
 Given this evidence, there is a material issue of fact 
as to whether or not Credit Alliance recognized the economic 
problems associated with the fundraising and whether or not 
Keller's performance, therefore, was the reason for his 
discharge.  If a jury were to accept Keller's evidence and 
interpretation of that evidence, it could reasonably conclude 
that Credit Alliance did not in fact fire him based upon any 
dissatisfaction with his ability to raise financing.  If a jury 
were to reject Credit Alliance's proffered reason, it could then 
reasonably conclude that Keller was terminated based upon his 
age.  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994); see 
also St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, (1993).  As 
material issues of fact remain in dispute, summary judgment in 
favor of Credit Alliance was inappropriate. 
 C. Failure to Promote. 
 The foregoing analysis of the evidence is applicable to 
both the wrongful discharge and the failure to promote claims, 
and will not be repeated here.  We will, however, clarify several 
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additional points raised by Credit Alliance that relate 
specifically to the failure to promote. 
 Credit Alliance argues that Keller has not demonstrated 
that he was qualified for the position of Chief Operating 
Officer, did not apply for the position, and that he is estopped 
from asserting a discrimination claim because as a member of the 
board of directors he voted for Copper's appointment.  We believe 
that there is sufficient evidence in the record for Keller's 
failure to promote claim to survive summary judgment.  First, 
Keller clearly established a prima facie case that he was 
qualified for the position of Chief Operating Officer.  Once 
again, the question is only whether he had the objective 
education and experience necessary.  See supra section III.B.1.A. 
 Second, Keller correctly argues that he was not required to 
apply for the position.  "[I]t is sufficient to make out a prima 
facie case for a plaintiff to `establish[] that the company had 
some reason or duty to consider him for the post.'"  Fowle v. C & 
C Cola, 868 F.2d at 68.  Keller's senior management position, his 
prior consideration for the position of President of Credit 
Alliance, and Ryan's knowledge that Keller was interested in the 
Chief Operating Officer position are sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case as to this claim.  Finally, there is no support 
for the argument that Keller is estopped from challenging his 
failure to be promoted because he voted with the other board 
members in ratifying Ryan's appointment.  As Keller correctly 
notes, the equal employment laws do not impose a requirement of 
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contemporaneous complaint or repeated protests.  See Townsend v. 
Indiana Univ., 995 F.2d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 Nor do we agree with Credit Alliance that its proffered 
justification for not considering or promoting Keller entitles it 
to summary judgment.  According to Ryan, the position of Chief 
Operating Officer required line experience and a thorough 
understanding of the company's business, which he claims Keller 
lacked.  As discussed above, Ryan's alleged statement that Keller 
may be too old to do his job, made only weeks before the 
promotion decision, is evidence from which a jury could infer 
discrimination.  Similarly, Keller points to evidence from the 
Chair of Credit Alliance's predecessor company that he did, in 
fact, have a thorough understanding of the business and was 
considered a candidate for president of the company at the time 
Ryan was ultimately selected.  In light of this evidence, a jury 
could conclude that Credit Alliance's claim that Keller was not 
qualified is pretextual.  Consequently, there is sufficient 
direct, as well as indirect, evidence from which a jury could 
conclude that Keller was not promoted because of his age. 
 IV. 
 Because the district court also dismissed Keller's 
claims under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, we must 
briefly address the NJLAD claims.  As the NJLAD and the ADEA "are 
governed by the same standards and burden of proof structures 
applicable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.", Waldron, 56 F.3d at 503; Erickson v. 
Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 569 (1990); Clowes v. 
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Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575 (1988), our discussion of 
Keller's claims under the ADEA applies here as well, and the 
district court's grant of summary judgment as to the NJLAD claim 
will be reversed. 
 V. 
 To summarize, we find that there was sufficient direct 
and indirect evidence of discrimination for Keller's ADEA and 
NJLAD claims to survive summary judgment.  We will, therefore, 
reverse the district court's judgment in its entirety and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 I respectfully dissent for three reasons. 
 First, I disagree with the majority's holding that 
there is enough "direct" evidence of age discrimination to cause 
the burden of persuasion to shift to the company.  Justice 
O'Connor's controlling opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment), concluded that, in order for the burden of persuasion 
to shift, "a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct 
evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor 
in the decision."  She explained that "[a]s an evidentiary 
matter, where a plaintiff has made this type of strong showing of 
illicit motivation, the factfinder is entitled to presume that 
the employer's discriminatory animus made a difference to the 
outcome, absent proof to the contrary from the employer."  Id.  
She continued: 
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Thus, stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of 
[discrimination], cannot justify requiring the employer 
to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were 
based on legitimate criteria.  Nor can statements by 
nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers 
unrelated to the decisional process itself, suffice to 
satisfy the plaintiff's burden in this regard. . . .  
What is required is what Ann Hopkins showed here: 
direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial 
negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in 
reaching their decision. 
 
 
Id. at 277 (emphasis added; internal citation omitted); see also, 
Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1994); Hook 
v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 373-76 (3d Cir. 1994);6 Griffiths 
                     
6.  The majority states:  "`circumstantial evidence "tied 
directly to the alleged discriminatory animus" is sufficient to 
constitute direct evidence justifying a burden-shifting 
instruction.'"  Maj. Op. at 12 (quoting Hook, 28 F.3d at 374 
(quoting Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 
(2d Cir. 1992)).  This statement is inconsistent with Justice 
O'Connor's opinion in Price Waterhouse, with Hook, and with 
Ostrowski.  In order for the burden to shift, the plaintiff must 
not only show discriminatory animus on the part of a 
decisionmaker but must connect that animus to the challenged 
employment decision.  In Ostrowski, the court stated: 
 
[I]f the plaintiff presents evidence of conduct or statements by 
persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may 
be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged 
discriminatory attitude, and that evidence is 
sufficient to permit the factfinder to infer that that 
attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor 
in the employer's decision, the jury should be 
instructed that if it does draw that inference the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover unless the employer 
has established by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the employer would have taken the same action without 
consideration of the impermissible factor. 
 
968 F.2d at 182 (emphasis added); see also  Griffiths, 988 F.2d 
at 470.  The statement in Hook that the majority partially quotes 
was as follows: 
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v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 469-70 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 
U.S. 865 (1993).7  
 In holding that the burden of persuasion should shift 
in this case, the majority relies solely on a remark allegedly 
made by Orix's chief executive officer, Daniel Ryan, about four 
or five months before Ryan decided that Keller should be 
terminated.  In 1989, Keller was given and accepted the task of 
arranging for $1.5 billion in financing, but he never came close 
to that target.  In April 1992, according to Keller's deposition, 
Ryan, who himself was more than 60 years of age, allegedly said 
to him: "If you are getting too old for the job, maybe you should 
hire one or two young bankers."8  If Keller's account is 
believed, Ryan's remark is relevant to show age bias.   
 But "[n]ot all evidence that is probative of 
discrimination will entitle the plaintiff to [shift the burden of 
persuasion] to the defendant under Price Waterhouse."  Griffiths, 
(..continued) 
Ostrowski . . . recognizes that circumstantial evidence "tied 
directly to the alleged discriminatory animus" must be 
produced to justify a burden-shifting instruction. 
 
28 F.3d at 374 (quoting Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 182).  This 
sentence stated that proof of discriminatory animus is necessary, 
and later Hook made clear that such proof is not sufficient.  See 
28 F.3d at 375 (statements by decisionmaker that were not 
"related to the decision process" not enough).  But the majority 
confuses what is necessary with what is sufficient. 
7.  This portion of Griffiths was unaffected by Miller v. CIGNA, 
47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1995) (in banc). 
8.  Ryan denied saying anything about Keller's being too old, and 
Keller's contemporaneous notes of this conversation also omit 
this portion of Ryan's alleged remark.  Keller's notes say 
simply: "He [Ryan] suggested I hire one or two young bankers."  
At the summary judgment stage, however, we must accept the 
version of the conversation set out in Keller's deposition.  
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988 F.2d at 470 (citation and internal quotation omitted); see 
also Hook, 28 F.3d at 374.   Ryan's alleged remark does not 
constitute the type of "strong showing" that is needed to shift 
the burden of persuasion.  The remark does not refer to the 
decision to fire Keller but rather to the hiring of "young 
bankers" to help him.  See Hook, 28 F.3d at 375 (remarks did not 
shift the burden of persuasion because, "[a]lthough they were 
made by a decisionmaker, there is no evidence they were related 
to the decision process").  And according to Keller himself, the 
remark was uttered approximately four months before the decision 
to fire him was made.  See id. (statements "temporally remote" 
from the challenged employment decision constitute weak evidence 
of bias in the decision making process).  In order for the burden 
of persuasion to shift, "[w]hat is required is . . . direct 
evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance 
on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision."  490 
U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).  Ryan's 
alleged remark does not meet this standard.  Rather, it is an 
example of precisely the type of proof that Justice O'Connor 
found to be insufficient: a "statement[] by [a] decisionmaker[] 
unrelated to the decisional process itself.  Id.  The majority 
has not cited a single case holding that a remark like that 
attributed to Ryan is enough to shift the burden of persuasion.9 
 I submit that the majority's holding here is wrong.10        
                     
9.  The majority cites Robinson v. PPG Industries, Inc., 23 F.3d 
1159 (7th Cir. 1994).  See Maj. Op. at 14.  In Robinson, however, 
the comments concerned discharge, see 23 F.3d at 1161-62, whereas 
here Ryan's alleged remark concerned the hiring of assistants for 
Keller.  In addition, in Robinson, the remarks were allegedly 
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 Second, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that 
the difference between Keller's age at the time of his firing 
(51) and that of his replacement (46) was "`sufficiently wide to 
give rise to an inference of discrimination.'"  Maj. Op. at 24 
(quoting Barber v. CSX Distribution Serv., 68 F.3d 694, 699 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  When the Supreme Court crafted the McDonnell Douglas 
prima facie case, it apparently concluded that there were a 
(..continued) 
made on several occasions, both before and after the termination, 
see id. at 1164, and the remarks were broad statements that 
"could be construed as interpretations of a corporate goal to 
boot employees out before they retired."  Id. at 1165.  In this 
case, Ryan allegedly made one comment, several months before he 
decided that Keller should be discharged, and the remark cannot 
be construed as involving a broad company policy. 
 
 The majority also cites Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 
398 (7th Cir. 1990).  See Maj. Op. at 14.  But Shager did not 
hold that the remarks made by the supervisor in that case were 
sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion.  Instead, it held 
only that the remarks, together with evidence of pretext, was 
enough to defeat summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas 
scheme.  See 913 F.2d at 402. 
10.  The distinction between cases in which the discriminatory 
animus played a role in the employment decision and those in 
which it did not is critical because it fits into the notion 
that, in different sectors of the economy, market forces work 
differently to eradicate discrimination.  In sectors of the 
economy where the competitive pressures of the market work to 
ensure that even if an employer has a personal animus against a 
particular group, he will not exercise it because of a fear that 
such behavior will result in his producing lower quality products 
and being driven out of the market, one should be reluctant to 
impose the costs of legal regulation.  In other words, in these 
sectors, although employers might have irrational prejudices, 
they are unlikely to exercise them because of a fear of market 
discipline. 
 
    On the other hand, in those sectors of the economy where 
competitive pressures do not work as well and employers with a 
discriminatory animus feel that they can exercise it without the 
fear of being driven out of the market, there is a need for legal 
regulation.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Aging and Old Age, 
334-35 (1995). 
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number of employers who harbored a sufficient degree of racial 
prejudice that they would pass over better qualified African-
American applicants in favor of inferior white applicants, even 
though it was contrary to the employers' economic interests to do 
so.  Thus, the rejection of a qualified African-American in favor 
of a white gave rise to an inference of discrimination and 
provided a reason for shifting the burden of production.  But is 
a similar inference reasonable when a 51-year old banker is 
replaced by a 46-year old in a decision made by a 60 year old?  
Are there a significant number of employers who harbor such 
prejudice against 51-year old bankers, as opposed to 46-year old 
bankers, that they are willing to favor the 46-year olds over the 
51-year olds, even though that will work against the employer's 
economic interests?  Cf. Posner, Aging and Old Age at 320 ("[T]he 
kind of `we-they' thinking that fosters racial, ethnic, and 
sexual discrimination is unlikely to play a large role in the 
treatment of the elderly worker") (footnote omitted); Thomas S. 
Ulen, The Law and Economics of the Elderly, 4 Elder L.J. 99, 124-
25 (1996).  Moreover, isn't the replacement of 51-year olds with 
46-year olds a sisyphean task?  After all, time's winged chariot 
hurries on; McDevitt, the 46-year old who was hired to replace 
Keller, recently turned 50 and by the time this case is over may 
well have achieved the milestone that allegedly resulted in 
Keller's demise.  Unlike the majority, I would hold that the age 
gap in this case is not wide enough to make out a prima facie 
case.11   
                     
11.  This case is distinguishable from Sempier v. Johnson & 
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 Third, under the test set out in Fuentes v. Perskie,   
  32 F.3d 759, 764-65 (3d Cir. 1994), which our in banc court 
reaffirmed in Sheridan v. DuPont, No. 94-7509, 1996 WL 659353, 
(Nov. 14, 1996), I do not think that the plaintiff adequately 
refuted the employer's legitimate reasons for his termination.  
Under this test, a plaintiff who has made out a prima facie case 
may defeat a motion for summary judgment by either (i) 
discrediting the proffered reasons, either circumstantially or 
directly, or (ii) adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or 
direct, that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating 
or determinative cause of the adverse employment action. 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.  Moreover, "[t]o discredit the 
employer's proffered reason . . . the plaintiff cannot simply 
show that the employer's decision was wrong or mistaken [but] 
must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the 
employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a 
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them 'unworthy of 
credence' . . . and hence infer 'that the employer did not act 
(..continued) 
Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 730 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2611 
(3d Cir. 1995).  There, the court held that the plaintiff had 
shown that his replacement was sufficiently younger by producing 
evidence that some of the plaintiff's duties were assumed by a 
person who was 10 years younger and some were assumed by a person 
who was four years younger.  45 F.3d at 729-30.  Thus, the gap in 
Sempier is somewhat larger than the gap here, and I think that 
Sempier is a good place to draw the line.    
 
 
Id. at 765 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). 
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for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.'"  Id. at 765 
(emphasis in original; citation omitted). 
 In this case, I do not think that the plaintiff 
satisfied the first prong of the Fuentes test.  The company says 
that it fired him because his performance was deficient, and it 
points to strong supporting evidence.  As noted, Keller was 
supposed to raise $1.5 billion in financing, but he fell far 
short of this goal.  Moreover, the company points to evidence 
that the goal was attainable: Keller's replacement met it in less 
than one year.  In sum, there was a strong legitimate economic 
rationale for the employer to have made the decision it did.  In 
our eagerness to ferret out and eradicate discriminatory abuse we 
must be careful not to deter employers from making legitimate 
business decisions. 
 The evidence adduced by Keller to show that this 
explanation was pretextual might at most be sufficient to raise a 
genuine question as to whether the company's evaluation of his 
performance was correct, but Keller's evidence does not 
"demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered 
legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder 
could rationally find them `unworthy of credence.'"  Id.    
 I also do not think that Keller satisfied the second 
prong of the Fuentes test, which requires "evidence . . . that 
discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or 
determinative cause of the adverse employment action." Id. Viewed 
together with the rest of the evidence, Ryan's alleged statement 
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is not sufficient to meet this requirement.  Thus, I do not think 
that Keller created a genuine question concerning the employer's 
proffered legitimate reason.  I would therefore affirm the 
decision of the district court with respect to both Keller's 
failure to promote and his discharge claims.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
